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The Possibility of Manipulated IPO Underpricing and
Post-IPO Stock Return: Empirical Study on Jakarta Stock
Exchange 2009-2012
Sugeng Purwanto*

Paramadina Graduate School of Business, Indonesia
Ritter and Welch (2002) explain there are two types of IPO firms, namely higher quality firms and
lower quality firms. This research propose the third type, namely bad IPO firms which manipulate
and force IPO underpricing. Bad IPO firms are subset of lower quality IPO firms that force false
signal as higher quality firms. The false signal was hidden by managing post-IPO trading. Trading
management are indirectly funded by using balance sheet cash. Hypothesis testing with the empirical
model 1 was to confirm the role of CashRatio as the moderating variable that interact DER to affect
IPO underpricing which originally was not. The findings support the predictions that interactive
variable DER*CashRatio affect IPO underpricing. A managed trading had a non negative profits
constraint so that selective post-IPO trading was conducted to cause trading imbalance observable
as skewed trading volume (Skewness). Subsequent tests with the empirical model 2 was to confirm
the role of Skewness as the moderating variable that interact VolRatio to affect post-IPO stock
return (RGM) which originally was not. The findings support the predictions that interactive variable
LnVolRatio*Skew affect RGM. Both findings confirm this research predictions on the possibility of
manipulated IPO trading in Indonesia IPO 2009-2012.
Keywords: CashRatio, DER, Initial Return, Skewness, Underpricing, VolRatio

Introduction
This research pursue the uniqueness of Indonesia Initial Public Offering (IPO) that can
not be accurately explained by previous studies
conducted in developed countries. Theories and
empirical findings on IPO cover many issues
such as asymmetric information (Baron, 1982),
shareholders wealth maximization (Aggarwal
et al, 2002), asymmetric information and signaling by high quality firms (Ritter and Welch,
2002), decision of percentage of shares to be offered (Zheng et al, 2005), high initial return but
low long-run return (Georgen, 2007), and also

many other empirical reports. However, this research offers modified approaches to adopt specific Indonesia context.
The discussion of Indonesia IPO is started
with how the allotment rules for IPO shares are
implemented.1 The underwriters were allowed
to separate issued shares into two kinds of allotments, namely fixed allotment which is a much
larger proportion of around 98% of the total
new shares, and pooling allotment which is
only 2% of the total shares. The fixed allotment
shares are usually offered to institutional investors during the book building before the offering period, and the shares of pooling allotment

* The Energy 22nd, SCBD Lot 11A Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 52-53, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12190. Email:
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would be allocated to retail investors. Fixed
allotment would be a guaranteed purchase orders through the underwriters; these are bidding
commitments so that the demand for the fixed
allotment will be known before the second and
final filling to the regulator.
On the contrary, demand by retail investors of pooling allotment shares would only be
known after the offering period; it could not be
known in advance.
After the offering period, it would also be
known whether the number of shares demanded
exceed the number of shares allocated on the
pooling allotment. At this stage, news of either over-subscribe or under-subscribe will be
known by public; which was actually refer to
the pooling allotment only. Fixed allotment
would not be changed, an order cancellation of
the fixed allotment was not an option.
On the other side, new demands by institutional investor was also possible. However, the
underwriter would only fulfil the new demands
by selling reserves from the fixed allotment if
the underwriter had planned to do so. Fulfilment of new demands of institutional investors
from the pooling allotment is not preferable
because of the risks of decreasing number of
public investors.2
There are two expected good news of IPOs
: (1) Over-subscribe, and (2) IPO underpricing.2
Logically, an over-subscribe IPO would be followed by an IPO underpricing. But it is not always the case.
It is also important to note that unlike in
New York Stock Exchange or other developed
stock exchanges, there is no market maker in
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).
As explained, pooling account is merely
small portion of the IPO. This is the root of opportunity for manipulation why over–subscription along with IPO underpricing can be created
as signal of successful IPOs.
If manipulated IPO trading exists, then the
funding is needed. There should be role of
founder shareholders to force top management
of IPO firms to allow indirect utilization of balance sheet cash. Other than this, subsequent
2
3

manipulation in the form of managed post-IPO
trading should be done to hide the false signal
of IPO underpricing. But there is a constraint of
non-zero profits during the market operations
which create certain trading pattern.
With regard to the above preliminary observations, this research name the IPO firms
which conducted manipulated trading as bad
IPO firms.
The research problem is whether the presence of bad IPO firms can be explained by factors related to balance sheet cash and post-IPO
trading volume pattern.
There are two research questions: (1) What
factors and whether the ratio of the balance
sheet cash to the IPO proceed affect IPO underpricing in Indonesia, and (2) What factors and
whether the volume trading skewness affect
post-IPO stock return.
The objective of this study is to find the answer of the possible existence of bad IPO firms
that manipulated IPO underpricing and managed post-IPO trading.
Basically, the newness and main contributions of this research are : 1). Modification
of the IPO firms concept of Ritter and Welch
(2002) and raising the concept of so called bad
IPO firms, 2). Application of moderating variable related to balance sheet cash that explain
IPO underpricing, 3). Application of moderating variable related to post-IPO trading volume
that explain post-IPO stock return, 4). A method
that bad IPO firms can be empirically observed
and explained.

Literature Review
Previous reports of IPO studies consider
many important things which are more applicable to the developed capital markets. Some
of previous IPO studies are the explanation of
percentage of shares to be offered, IPO pricing, and future stock performance. Zheng et
al (2005) state that during an IPO, several important factors are considered important which
include the percentage of shares offered, IPO
pricing, and IPO underpricing. Other than these,

Main board listing: min. 1000 investors; development board: min. 500 investors.
An IPO is underpricing when the offer price is lower than the first-day closing price.
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long-run trading liquidity is one of the founder
shareholders objectives. Georgen (2007) reemphasize the past empirical evidences of two
main anomalies on the IPO, notably high initial
return but poor long-run return.
Other objective of IPO underpricing is the
long-run founder shareholders wealth maximization as explained by Aggarwal et al (2002),
and Ang and Brau (2003) as cited by Zheng et
al (2005).
Empirical studies also provide evidences
of IPO underpricing according with finance
literature that provide theoretical explanation
including asymmetric information as reported
by Baron (1982), Rock (1986), Welch (1989),
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Faulhaber (1989),
and Balvers et al (1993). IPO firms deliberately underprice their shares to create signal of
a good quality. However, to create signals the
IPO firms should bear the cost of underpricing;
they sell the shares lower than fair market price.
Booth and Chua (1996) explain IPO underpricing will induce investors to provide information to the IPO firms and eventually will lead
to IPO over-subscribing.
Ritter and Welch (2002) explain asymmetric
information on IPO that higher quality firms deliberately underprice their shares to deter lower
quality firms from imitating their actions. Theoretical framework of this research is built and
based on the IPO signaling theory. But modifications are developed to accommodate the Indonesia context. The main difference of arguments of this research compared with Ritter and
Welch (2002) is lower quality IPO firms may
be able to imitate signal by higher quality IPO
firms by creating false signal of manipulated
IPO underpricing and managed post-IPO trading. The false signal might not be known by investors during the period of price management
and operations.
Aggarwal and Wu (2006) explain variety
ways of stock price manipulation that can also
be taken by corporate insiders. It is explained
how insiders may manage stock price and trading volume with the objective of creating trading profits.
Chen et al (2001) report the relation of stock
market return, trading volume, and volatility in

nine major stock markets and found that trading volume provides information to the stock
index.
The arguments of Ritter and Welch (2002)
on IPO underpricing as signaling imply: (1)
IPO firms hold superior information relative to
the investors regarding the future prospects of
the firms, (2) There exist lower quality of IPO
firms try mimicking the signal of higher quality
IPO firms by IPO underpricing but could not to
do so because IPO underpricing is costly.
This research build arguments for signaling
concept of IPO underpricing as follow:
1. Higher quality IPO firms send true signal
and the investors believe it. This is a real
IPO underpricing.
2. Higher quality IPO firms send true signal.
But investors do not believe it. IPO underpricing may not exist.
3. Lower quality IPO firms which can not send
signal be honest, there is no IPO underpricing.
4. Some lower quality IPO firms send false signal and force IPO underpricing. These types
of firms are named bad IPO firms.
Bad IPO firms were able manipulating IPO
underpricing by utilizing balance sheet cash
indirectly. They manipulate the trading by utilizing founder shareholders shares which is
much larger than the pooling allotment shares
that only 2% of the total IPO shares. Founder
shareholders had to manage and negotiate with
investors that hold significant fixed allotment
shares not to sell their shares in order to avoid
stock price down. In Indonesia case, it is possible if IPO float is not large and the respective investors are within the group of founder
shareholders. IPO trading manipulation should
be continued until post-IPO to hide the false
signal. Funding requirements were facing a
non negative profits constraint so that selective
post-IPO trading activities had to be employed.
This constraint may create trading imbalance
observable as skewed post-IPO trading volume.
If the investors do not know the signal was actually false, then the trading support by bad IPO
firms would be minimal.
The presence of bad IPO firms is confirmed
when these two conditions are met, namely
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manipulated IPO underpricing and managed
post-IPO trading. Lower quality IPO firms are
defined as firms with high debt-to-equity ratio
(DER) and/ or negative operating cash flow. A
bad IPO firms are defined as a subset of lower
quality firms with these following additional arguments:
High DER alone may not cause IPO underpricing. But DER moderated by CashRatio
will positively affect IPO underpricing. The
operational variable is the interactive variable
DER*CashRatio to affect IPO underpricing. It
is the necessary condition.
VolRatio which is measured as the ratio between first-day trading volume and the mean of
post-IPO trading volume may not affect stock
return. But VolRatio moderated by post-IPO
volume trading skewness may have significant
effect to post-IPO stock return. Interactive variable of Volratio*Skew to negatively affect postIPO stock return. It is the sufficient condition.

Research Methods
Hypotheses of IPO underpricing
IPO underpricing is measured as Initial Return. The main focus of the model 1 is the variable of CashRatio which moderate DER to affect
Initial Return. DER should not affect Initial Return; as well as CashRatio should not. But DER
moderated by CashRatio should affect Initial
Return in order to confirm a manipulated IPO
underpricing to exist. Interaction variable of
DER and CashRatio, namely DER*CashRatio
is predicted to positively affect Initial Return.
Mendez (2011) found the higher the floating
the lower the underpricing. The higher the IPO
underpricing the higher the price-to-earningratio (PER) of the IPO firms ceteris paribus, so
that difference of IPO firms PER and sub-sector PER should positively influence the degree
of IPO underpricing. Return on equity (ROE)
measures the management performance with
respect to the founder shareholders equity; the
higher the ROE the better the performance and
the higher the firm quality. DER should positively affect initial return.
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) using Loga-
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rithmic age as proxy of ex-ante uncertainty that
affect IPO underpricing. Loughran and Ritter
(2004) using calendar year of IPO minus calendar year of incorporation as measurement
of variable that also affect IPO underpricing.
Derrien and Womack (2003) show the effect of
market conditions to IPO underpricing.
The alternate hypotheses statements:
H1.1.: Debt-to-equity ratio moderated by
CashRatio affect Initial Return.
H1.2.: Volume of floating affect Initial Return.
H1.3.: Difference of price-to-earning-ratio affect
Initial Return.
H1.4.: Difference return-to-equity affect Initial
Return.
H1.5.: Sales affect Initial Return.
H1.6.: Age of IPO firm affect Initial Return.
H1.7.: Listing board affect Initial Return.
H1.8.: Five-day market return affect Initial Return.
Hypotheses of post-IPO stock return
Higher quality IPO firms let the liquidity
(volume), price, and stock return determined
by the market post-IPO trading. On the opposite, bad IPO firms have to continue managing
and supporting the post-IPO trading for certain
trading period with the objective to continue
imitating and confirming signal as higher quality firms. A manipulated but smooth trading
may be too costly if not followed by many investors participating in the trading. With non
negative profits as the constraint, there will be
less liquid post-IPO trading volume relative to
the first-day IPO trading. Hence, skewed trading volume may exists. The prediction is that
post-IPO stock return is affected by volume
ratio which is moderated by volume trading
skewness.
Ibbotson (1975) reported negative effect of
initial return to long-term performance. However, in the presence of bad IPO firms initial return is the basis of the return management. This
research predict initial return positively affect
post-IPO return.
Volume of float should negatively affect
post-IPO return to guarantee non negative profits because the trading would be more manage-
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Table 1. Variable definition of model 1
Variable
IR
Vfloat
DER*CashRatio
DPER
DROE
LnSales
LnMo
Dboard
RM5

Explanation
First-day of trading return
First-day trading liquidity
Interactive Variable
CashRatio: moderating variable
Difference of PER
Difference of ROE
Sales
Age
Dummy variable for listing
Last-week market return

Measurement
[P1-Po]/Po. P1: first-day closing price, Po: offer price
Ln(first-day trading volume/ IPO floating percentage)
Debt-to-equity ratio multiplied with CashRatio
CashRatio = Pre-IPO cash/ IPO proceed
(Firm PER–Subsector PER mean)/Subsector PER mean
IPO book ROE – Previous year ROE
Ln(total sales)
Ln(months of Age from incorporation to the date of IPO)
“1” : if the main board, ” 0” : if the development board
Five-trading-day geometric return up to IPO date

Table 2. Variable definition of model 2
Variable
RGM
IR
LnVolratio*Skew
RMGM

Explanation
Post-IPO stock return
Initial Return
Interactive variable
Skewness: moderating variable
Market Return

Measurement
Geometric mean return of 97-trading-day
[P1-Po]/Po. P1: first-day closing price, Po : offer price
Ln(VolRatio*Skewness]
VolRatio = first-day trading volume/the mean of 97-trading-day trading volume
97-trading-day geometric mean return of IDX

able to bad IPO firms if the number of stocks
issued were smaller.
Pre-IPO balance sheet cash in the form
CashRatio had been predicted to affect initial
return in model 1. Post-IPO balance sheet cash
will also be tested in model 2 whether it affect
post-IPO stock return.
Schultz and Zaman (1994) show aftermarket
support of an IPO is necessary to avoid stock
price decline. Robinson et al (2004) explain the
role of underwriters that the greater the stock
retention the lower the probability of required
after market price support.
The alternate hypotheses statements:
H2.1.: VolRatio moderated by skewness affect
post-IPO stock return.
H2.2.: IPO initial return affect post-IPO stock
return.
H2.3.: Volume of IPO floating affect post-IPO
stock return.
H2.4.: Post-IPO cash affect post-IPO stock return.
H2.5.: Market return affect post-IPO stock return.
Empirical models
There are two empirical models adopted.
Model 1 will be used to test factors that cause
IPO underpricing, and model 2 will be used to
test factors that cause post-IPO stock return.

Model 1. IPO underpricing
IR i = α + β1 DER*CashRatioi + β2 Vfloati
+ β3 DPERi + β4 DROEi
+ β5 LnSalesi + β6 LnMoi
+ β7 Dboardi + β8 RM5i + εi
1)
Model 2. Post-IPO stock return
RGM i = γ + δ1 VolRatio*Skewi + δ2 IRi
+ δ3 Vfloati + δ4 LnCashPostIPOi
+ δ5 RMGMi + υi
2)

Result and Discussion
Descriptive statistics, estimation output
model 1, and estimation output model 2 are
presented in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 respectively.
The sample is post financial crisis IPOs
listed in IDX of four years 2009-2012. When
the financial turmoil facing the US in 2008,
many Indonesia IPOs were postponed due to
low demand for new issues and low valuation.
There were only eight Indonesia firms floating
their shares during the difficult year. Financial
market began to recover in 2009 so the firms
start building confidence toward stock market.
The sample is 82 IPO firms consist of 13 IPOs
(2009), 23 IPOs (2010), 25 IPOs (2011) and 22
IPOs (2012). There are 46 IPOs listed in the
117
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of raw data
IPO firms total assets (trillion)
IPO firms total sales (trillion)
IPO firms RoE (%)
Pre-IPO cash (billion)
IPO floating percentage
IPO proceed IDR (billion)
CashRatio
Firm closing PER at-IPO
Subsector closing PER at-IPO
Shares traded at-IPO (million)
At-IPO Trading Volume (million)
Post IPO average daily transaction (million)
VolRatio

Obs
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82
82

Mean
3.82
1.14
0.705
443
24.415%
774
0.589
81.69
15.53
251
251
19.91
42.072

main board and 36 IPOs in the development
board. The fundamental data were found from
the IPO prospectus. Transaction data were collected from on-line trading provider.
The first IPO listing date was in 15 January 2009 and the last date was in 19 December
2012. There are 70 IPOs underpricing, 11 IPOs
overpricing, and one IPO neither underpricing
nor overpricing (Table 3).
A window of 97-trading day is chosen so
that the last trading day was in 14 May 2013 of
the last IPO in 19 December 2012 IPO.4
Diagnostic tests.5
Test of multicollinearity for model 1 is conducted by using Variance Inflation Factor defined as VIF = 1/(1-ρ2) with a critical value of
10. There is no multicollinearity in the model 1.
Test of heteroscedasticity for model 1 is conducted by using Glejser heteroscedasticity test
with a critical value of │+/- 1.96│ at α=5%.
There is no heteroscedasticity in the model 1.
There is also no multicollinearity on the
model 2. Glejser heteroscedasticity test for
model 2 provide the highest t-value of 2.72.
However, there is no opportunity to take natural logarithm on it because IR value could be
negative. Other than this, standardization by
taking the square root of negative numbers is
not defined.6

Median
1.15
0.36

0.105
47.4
22.10%
298
0.185
24.14
14.53
95.206
95.2
5.01
21.101

Max.
48.7
12.7
45.28
8,120
3.39%
6.29
6.235

2,486.29
38.29

1,660
1,660
187,000
201.673

Min.
0.22
0.03
-0.809
0.481
9.742%
30.1
0.006
-119.50
1.27
0.18
0.18
17.032
0.201

Std. Dev.
7.62
2.11
4.991
1.32
11.303%
1180
1.193
286.2
7.98
379
379
28.9
50.566

Squared R and F-tests.
On the model 1, The R squared is 32.9% so
that the variations of the dependent variable are
only 32.9% explained by the variations of the
independent variables. However, F-test of 4.49
is larger than the critical value of F-table of ~
2.10 at α=5% (with degree of freedom of 8 for
numerator and 72 for denominator) so that the
null hypothesis of altogether β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 =
β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 =0 should be rejected at α=5%.
Model 1 is said to be valid.
On the model 2, the R squared is 22.5% so
that the variations of the dependent variable are
only 22.5% explained the variations of the independent variables; while the other 77.5% are
explained by the other factors do not included
in the model. However the F-test with a null
hypothesis of altogether δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 =
δ5 = 0, with the degree-of-freedom of 5 for numerator and 76 for denominator at α=5% give
a critical value ~ 2.37. The calculated F of 4.43
is larger than the critical value so that the null
hypothesis should be rejected. The model 2 is
also valid.
Analysis of IPO underpricing
Estimation of model 1 provide evidences
IPO underpricing are explained by five explanatory variables. But the other three variables do

97-trading-day is arbitrary chosen that is sufficient to observe trading manipulations but not too long so that the observed
pattern of post-IPO trading may be faded in the longer-term stock price movements.
5
There is no issue of serial correlation for cross-sectional data. Error is assumed normally distributed because sample is
large enough.
6
Gujarati and Porter (2009), Basic Econometric, 5th edition, McGraw-Hill International Edition: 340, 378-380, 400.
4
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Table 4. Model 1 estimation output: Test for IPO underpricing
Dependent Variable: IR

Observations : 82

Independent Variable
DER*CashRatio
Vfloat
DPER
DROE
LnSales
LnMo
Dboard
RM5
Constant
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic

Coefficient
0.01
-0.04
0.00
0.07
-0.03
-0.01
0.11
-0.16
1.51
0.33
0.26
4.49

not explain. The hypothesis testing is conducted with null-hypothesis of βi = 0 at α=5% provide a critical value of +/-1.96. The calculated
t-statistics can be seen in the Table 4.
(a). DER*CashRatio. With regard to model 1,
this research focus on the possible presence
of bad IPO firms by investigating the role of
CashRatio as the moderating variable. The estimated coefficient for DER*CashRatio is significantly different from zero at α=5%. The conclusion is DER*CashRatio positively explain
Initial Return as expected. Other regression had
been conducted that DER and CashRatio as
two separate independent variables each does
not explain Initial Return IR.
It is concluded that CashRatio has significant
contribution to the causality of DER to Initial
Return. DER*CashRatio is the interaction variable that affect IR. Test results of model 1 confirm CashRatio as the moderating variable.
The higher the DER*CashRatio the higher the
IR (underpricing) the more favorable the IPO
firms to the investors.
In relation with manipulated IPO underpricing,
lower quality IPO firms with high DER without high CashRatio would not be able to force
IPO underpricing and could not imitate signal
as explained by Ritter and Welch (2002). But
bad IPO firms were be able to do so by utilizing the capacity of cash which is sufficiently
available in the balance sheet. The higher the

Hypothesis
H1.1
H1.2
H1.3
H1.4
H1.5
H1.6
H1.7
H1.8
-

Prob (F-statistic)

t-statistic
2.39*
-2.81**
2.40*
1.32
-2.34*
-0.23
2.05*
-0.15
4.25
** Significant at α 1%
* Significant at α=5%
0.00

Prob
0.02*
0.01**
0.02*
0.19
0.03*
0.81
0.04*
0.87
0.00

DER*CashRatio which is in the same direction
with the higher the ratio of balance sheet cash
to the IPO proceed, the more power and confidence of bad IPO firms to finance the trading
against shares from the pooling allotment.7
(b). Vfloat. The t-test for Vfloat is |-2.81| higher
than critical value of |-1.96|; the null-hypothesis
is rejected at α=5%. The conclusion is Vfloat
negatively affect initial return; the higher Vfloat
the lower initial return. Recall that the measurement of Vfloat is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the first-day trading volume to the pecentage of IPO floating. The expectation according
to the theory is the higher the percentage of
IPO float (denominator of the Vfloat measurement) the lower the IPO underpricing. However, the result is the opposite. The possible explanation is in the case of bad IPO firms an IPO
underpricing is a manipulation. The offer price
was not underpriced and the first-day closing
price was pushed upward; these activities were
to create trading profits. In this case the higher
the IPO float the higher the IPO underpricing in
order to maximize manipulated trading profits.8
The results also imply the higher the first-day
trading volume (numerator of Vfloat measurement) the lower the IPO underpricing. In the
case of bad IPO firms, any involvement of fixed
allotments investors outside the bad IPO firms
group would affect manipulation activities. If
the trading participation of these outside in-

It is also assumed that bad IPO firms had communicated with investors of fixed allotment shares with large ownership
so that they would not destroy the plan.
8
Even if floating percentage is large, the total value of issued shares may be low in the case of bad IPO firms so that manipulation management was still possible.
7
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Table 5. Model 2 estimation output: Test of post-IPO stock return
Dependent Variable: RGM

Observations : 82

Independent Variable
LnVolRatio*Skew
IR
Vfloat
LnCashPostIPO
RMGM
Constant
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic

Coefficient
-4.20.10-4
3.14.10-4
-6.18.10-5
-6.47.10-5
0.31879
0.01
0.23
0.17
4.43

vestors along with pooling allotment investors
were low, then the trading profits would be low
because outsider participation volume were
low. However, it was easier to push the price
up to maximize trading profits. If the participation were high which is observable as high firstday trading volume, then the IPO underpricing
would be low because it was more difficult to
push the price up. However, trading profits of
bad IPO firms group might be high because outsider participation volume were high. These are
the explanations why Vfloat negatively affect
initial return.
(c). DPER. Initial Return is positively affected
by DPER at α=5%. Stock Price is determined
by the earnings multiple PER and IPO firms
earnings. If bad IPO firms exist, then logically
they prefer managing a high PER rather than
a high earnings. Earnings management is possible. However, it is risky; earnings figure will
be recorded as operating performance of bad
IPO firms. On the other hand, a high PER is
more subjective and determined by the market
so that an upward bias is considered as market
valuation.
(d). LnSales. The finding shows that LnSales
negatively affect initial return. IPO underpricing is a signal (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Arguably, sales is also a signal of quality. The higher
the sales the better the firms image. The higher
the sales the lesser the degree of IPO underpricing required as signal as good firms; ceteris
paribus. The negative causality of LnSales to
IPO initital return (underpricing) is as expected.
(e). Dboard. The findings show that DBoard
positively affect IPO underpricing. Even if
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Hypothesis
H2.1
H2.2
H2.3
H2.4
H2.5
-

Prob (F-statistic)

t-statistic
-2.51*
2.48*
-0.29
-0.26
1.39
0.91
** Significant at α 1%
* Significant at α=5%
0.00

Prob
0.01*
0.02*
0.77
0.79
0.17
0.37

there is no specific differences in treatments of
trading in the two listing boards in IDX namely
main board and development board, the listing
in the main board is still considered more bona
fide. Actually, to be listed in the main board in
IDX is not a challenging task. Three main criteria are the year of incorporation, subsequent
positive earnings, and the number of public investors more than one thousand. When considering IPO underpricing as a signal of a good
firm quality, a listing in the main board should
be preferable. Bad IPO firms prefer pursuing a
main board listing to strengthen their false signal. Hence, the positive effect of Dboard to Initial Return is as expected.
(f). DROE, LnMo, and RM5. Three independent variables namely : DROE, LnMo, and RM5
each do not affect initial return.
Analysis of post-IPO stock return
Hypothesis testing is conducted with significance level α=5% so that the critical value
is +/- 1.96 to decide whether each independent
variable to affect post-IPO stock return. The estimated t-statistic can be seen in Table 5.
(a). LnVolRatio*Skew. The t-test show estimated
t-value of |-2.509| is larger than critical value of
|-1.96|; the null-hypothesis is rejected at α=5%.
The conclusion is that LnVolRatio*Skew negatively affect RGM as expected.
Prior to the estimation of this regression, another estimation was conducted with stock return as dependent variable against independent
variables of VolRatio, Skewness, Vfloat, IR,
LnCashPostIPO, and RMGM. Two separate
independent variables VolRatio and skewness
each does not affect stock return. The causal-
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ity of VolRatio to stock return is significantly
changed when Skewness is included in the form
of interactive variable VolRatio*Skew. This
finding support the prediction of this research.
Skewness has significant contingent effect on
the causality of VolRatio to post-IPO stock return; the role of a moderating variable. When
bad IPO firms manage post-IPO trading, they
were facing a non negative constraint so that
selective trading had to be adopted which cause
skewed trading volume as predicted.
(b). IR. The results show a t-value of 2.48 so
that the null hypothesis of δ2 = 0 is rejected at at
α=5%. Initial Return IR positively affect postIPO stock return; IPO firms which exhibits positive IR will continue delivering positive postIPO return on the medium-term. In the case of
bad IPO firms, the trading management will
pursue positive post-IPO return to strengthen
the false signal of IPO underpricing as long as
non negative constraint is met.
(c). Vfloat. The result shows Vfloat do not affect post-IPO stock return. The indirect effect
of Vfloat to medium-term stock return, if any,
has already been captured by Initial Return IR
on the test of model 1.
(d). LnCashPostIPO and RMGM. The result
shows that LnCashPostIPO does not affect postIPO stock return as expected. Stock valuation
already consider post-IPO cash, there should be
no surprise on this variable. The test on RMGM
also shows no causality effect of RMGM as the
control variable to post-IPO stock return.
Combined results of both models
The hypotheses testing of model 1 confirm IPO underpricing is positively affected by
DER*CashRatio with CashRatio as the moder-

ating variable.
The hypotheses testing of model 2 confirm
post-IPO stock return is negatively affected by
LnVolRatio*Skew, with Skewness as the moderating variable.
Explanation of DER*CashRatio to initial
return is the first or necessary condition to
the presence of bad IPO firms which employing the power of CashRatio to manipulate
IPO underpricing. Further, the explanation of
LnVolRatio*Skew to post-IPO stock return is
the second or sufficient condition for the presence of bad IPO firms with skewed post-IPO
trading volume to affect stock return.

Conclusion
The position of this research is to propose the
concept of the presence of bad IPO firms. The
first main finding is bad IPO firms could force
IPO underpricing by utilizing the ratio of balance sheet cash to the IPO proceed. The second
main finding is non negative managed trading
constraint would create skewed post-IPO trading volume which affect post-IPO stock return.
The first research questions can be answered
that five factors, namely DER*CashRatio,
Vfloat, DPER, LnSales, and Dboard affect IPO
underpricing. Particularly, CashRatio has significant contribution that interact to debt-to-equity ratio to affect IPO underpricing. The second research question is also can be answered.
Two factors, namely LnVolRatio*Skew, and IR
affect medium-term IPO stock return. Particularly, Skewness has significant contribution that
interact the ratio of first-day IPO trading volume to the mean of post-IPO trading volume
to affect post-IPO stock return. With these two
main findings, it can be confirmed the possible
existence of bad IPO firms that manipulated
IPO underpricing and managed post-IPO trading.
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